



Under the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (the Cable
Act),' municipal regulation of rates for cable television service has
been effectively preempted by the FCC for the vast majority of
domestic cable systems At the same time, the Cable Act affirmed
the right of each municipality to "award .. .one or more franchises
within its jurisdiction." In addition, "a cable operator may not
provide cable service without a franchise." Thus, in a single stroke,
the federal government eliminated local rate regulation and granted
municipalities the power to control entry and award de facto
monopoly franchises.
This landmark policy decision created a rather unusual regulatory
environment for cable television. Typically, in regulated industries
with pronounced economies of scale or scope, state or local regula-
tory authorities have the power to grant monopoly franchises to
firms in return for a commitment from the firm to serve all comers
at reasonable rates to be determined by the franchising authority.
Thus, under the typical "social contract," the regulated firm acquires
a monopoly franchise, but surrenders the power to set the terms of
service. In the cable industry, however, federal preemption of local
rate-regulation authority prevents municipalities from directly
constraining the market power of incumbent monopolists by setting
rates. Moreover, since contractual restrictions on rates are preempted
as well, municipalities are unable to promote Demsetzian "competi-
tion for the market" by requiring cable operators to bid for
franchises on the basis of a contractual commitment to future rates.'
t Albert K. Smiley, President and Chief Executive Officer of Smiley Brothers, Inc.
and former Director of Research for the Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice. Princeton University, Ph.D. 1978. The author would like to thank
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In his timely Article on overbuild competition and franchising
policy, Thomas W. Hazlett focuses on the potential impact of an
open entry policy in encouraging more widespread direct competi-
tion among cable television systems, constraining rates, and improv-
ing service.5 Hazlett applies public choice theory to analyze the
welfare effects of the municipal franchising decision.' He hypothesizes
that municipal franchising authorities generally will have an incentive
to grant monopoly franchises to incumbent cable operators in
exchange for side payments to municipal officials and political
pressure groups.7 Hazlett claims that open entry and competition
would make consumers and society better off in terms of economic
welfare, but that municipalities will rarely opt for such a policy. He
suggests that, absent municipal control over franchising, potential
and actual competition would be much more widespread and would
be a significant factor in constraining rates and improving service.'
Finally, he argues that given rate deregulation, society would be
better served by a uniform policy of open entry, which implies a
need for preemption of municipal franchising authority."
The major contribution of Hazlett's work is to call attention to the
anomalous regulatory environment embodied in the Cable Act. It is
indeed unusual for local regulatory authorities to be empowered to
create franchise monopolies without having any concomitant power
to constrain rates. Clearly, the combination of regulatory provisions
contained in the Act entails a significant risk that some municipal
franchising authorities will sell out consumer interests by awarding
exclusive franchises to cable operators in return for side payments.
However, major criticisms of Hazlett's position can be made. First,
his public choice analysis is too one-sided in that it completely
discounts the possibility of municipal responsiveness to consumer
interests. Second, his analysis of the welfare effects of municipal
franchising and overbuild competition is flawed in that he under-
estimates the potential for open entry to reduce welfare and con-
sumer's surplus under certain market conditions. Third, he fails to
present convincing evidence that, absent municipal franchising
authority, potential and actual entry would effectively constrain rates
in most domestic cable markets. Moreover, even in markets where
5. Hazlett. Duopoistic Competition in CATV. Implications for Public Policy, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 65 (1990).
6. Id. at 80-84.
7. Id. at 85.
8. Id. at 113.
9. Id. at 114-19.
Vol. 7: 121, 1990
Critique of Open Entry in CATV
entry can occur, significant practical problems remain which may
require some sort of municipal intervention. Fourth, to give a
complete answer to the central question posed by Hazlett (i.e.
whether municipal franchising authority should be preempted), it is
necessary to relax the assumption that federal preemption of local
rate regulation is engraved in stone. In particular, since Hazlett's
open entry policy might require a revision of the Cable Act to
preempt municipal franchising, it is appropriate to consider
modification of the ratemaking provisions of the Act as well.
I. Public Choice Analysis
The core of Hazlett's analysis is his public choice model of
municipal franchising behavior. Hazlett argues that individual voters
are likely to be ignorant of the potential benefits of overbuild
competition and that the transaction costs of organizing consumers
to monitor the performance of franchising authorities are prohibitive-
ly high. As a result, municipal authorities have an incentive to grant
a monopoly franchise to a single operator in exchange for side
payments in cash and in kind, which are then distributed to various
special interest groups in exchange for political support. Thus, in
Hazlett's scenario, municipal authorities completely discount the
benefits of competition to consumers. Hazlett concludes that
incumbent cable operators generally can induce franchising authori-
ties to erect barriers to entry through the franchising process."0
A. Conceptual Problems with Hazlett's Model of Public Choice
In evaluating Hazlett's argument, it is important to keep in mind
several features of cable television markets. First, cable service is a
highly visible product about which consumers are likely to be well
informed. Second, consumers have one important political advantage
over incumbent operators and special interest groups: they have
more votes. Third, once a cable operator has built its system, it is
essentially trapped in the market because the salvage value of cable
plant is practically nil. This gives municipal authorities a chance to
behave opportunistically by allowing additional entry after the
incumbent has been led to believe that it has paid off the authorities
to acquire a monopoly franchise.
10. Id. at 82.
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Despite the superficial appeal of Hazlett's argument, there is no
compelling theoretical case that consumer ignorance and transaction
cost asymmetries will generally lead to the successful manipulation
of municipal franchising decisions by incumbent operators. One
could just as easily argue that municipalities would tend to opt for
too much competition, in terms of total welfare maximization,
because they would weigh the interests of their primary voting
constituency--consumers--too heavily and discount the increased
costs and lower profits of cable operators. Hazlett's entire public
choice argument is based on the unsupported assumption that
municipal franchising authorities have insufficient political incentives
to promote competition. Thus, the outcome he postulates is
completely conjectural.
B. Empirical Evidence on Municipal Franchising Practices
Absent a compelling theoretical case, the extent to which
incumbent operators influence franchising decisions and successfully
deter entry is an empirical question. I am not aware of any
compelling empirical evidence that municipal authorities generally
seek to prevent overbuild competition. Instead, what we observe is
that there are very few overbuilds." There are at least two plausible
explanations of this phenomenon: the public choice explanation
given by Hazlett and the conventional explanation that overbuild
competition is simply uneconomic in most markets because of
pronounced economies of scale and scope in providing cable
television service within a given geographic area. 2
Hazlett's assertion that municipalities routinely seek to impede
competitive entry is supported by anecdotal evidence involving
several overbuilds in Florida and Sacramento."3 However, in an
industry with over 7,000 cable systems, and given the idiosyncrasies
of local regulators and maverick operators, it is possible to find
11. See id. at 65 ("exclusive franchises are the overwhelmingly dominant market
structure in the cable television industry").
12. See Noam, Economies of Scale in Cable Televisiom A Multiproduct Analysis, in VIDEO
MEDIA COMPETITION 93 (1985).
13. See Hazlett, supra note 5, at 90-113.
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anecdotes to support almost any proposition.14 Thus, anecdotes tell
us little about how franchising authorities generally behave.
The empirical evidence presented by Hazlett to support his theory
of public choice is sketchy. Zupan found that cable operators often
add costly special features to their systems, presumably to help them
obtain franchises. 5 However, Zupan's study also shows that municipal
rate regulation significantly constrained prices, which appears to be
inconsistent with Hazlett's public choice analysis. 8 Hazlett argues,
based on his unpublished study of rate deregulation in California,
that "local price controls were not used to enhance consumer welfare
.. , but were used primarily as leverage by governments to enforce
cross-subsidy agreements between firms and franchisers."' 7 It is not
clear why municipalities would need to use rate controls as an
enforcement mechanism since they could threaten to award a second
franchise if the required cross-subsidies were not forthcoming.
At most, Hazlett's evidence shows that some municipal govern-
ments have elected to oppose entry by would-be overbuilders.
However, it is overreaching to conclude that, "[e]ntry will be deter-
red not because of natural monopoly conditions, but because munici-
pal franchisers do not adequately consider consumer interests."
14. For example, an article in the cable trade press noted that:
city councils which, faced with a new era of powerlessness as a result of the Cable
Communications Policy Act, have begun looking on second franchises, or at least the
threat of them, as a method to exert control over cable companies in the form of
price competition and provision of services. However, while the threat of an
overbuild has worked in many cases to move established operators toward
rebuilding their systems, in most cases where cities have actually invited a second
bidder into the market, they have met with failure. John Witt, city attorney for
San Diego, noted that despite that jurisdiction's attempts over the past year to
attract additional cable operators to that market, there have been no responses to
the city's request for proposals. That experience has been repeated in Erie, Pa.,
where the ATC system has been battling with the city council over rates and in
several other locations around the country. The experience these cities have had
with seeking overbuilds and their inability to attract new cable operators points up
a fundamental attitude about overbuilds in the cable industry--they are basically
uneconomic.
Kahn, How Safe Is Cable's 'Natural Monopoly'?, Cablevision, Oct. 13, 1986, at 60. Obviously,
the San Diego and Erie experiences related in the article appear to be inconsistent with
Hazlett's public choice analysis.
15. Zupan, The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Television: Some
Systematic Evidence, 32 J.L. & ECON. 401 (1989).
16. If Hazlett's theory of public choice were correct, municipalities would have an
incentive to set rates at the monopoly level to maximize the potential side payments from
the franchisee.
17. Hazlett, supra note 5, at 74.
18. Id. at 82.
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II. Analysis of Welfare Effects
Traditional cost/benefit analysis of overbuild competition suggests
that the welfare effects of overbuilds are ambiguous because the
increased costs of duplicated facilities must be balanced against the
increase in consumer surplus caused by the lower prices and the
greater product variety resulting from direct competition. 9 Hazlett
criticizes this approach on the grounds that it treats the incumbent's
sunk costs as marginal social costs, lacks a "plausible public choice
model of the municipal decision to award cable franchises," and "fails
to allow profit-maximizing firms to internalize rationally the costs of
duplication." 0 I will consider each of these points in turn.
A. Sunk Costs and Marginal Social Costs
Hazlett argues that, in the case of sequential entry, the initial
entrant's fixed investment is largely sunk and therefore irrelevant in
analyzing welfare effects and determining optimal public policy."
This would be true if the only policy objective were to maximize
incremental welfare gains over the useful life of the cable system
after initial entry has occurred. However, since the useful life of
cable plant is about fifteen years, cable operators and municipalities
face a continuing cycle of plant depreciation, rebuilds, upgrades, and
refranchising decisions. Contrary to Hazlett's presumption, today's
sunk costs become tomorrow's marginal social costs. Moreover, the
focus of the public policy debate should be on determining a
franchising policy that will maximize social welfare in the long run,
rather than on the myopic maximization of short-run welfare gains
during one franchising cycle after initial entry occurs. Thus, the sunk
costs of the initial entrant are relevant to the social welfare calculus
of overbuild competition with sequential entry.
19. See SMILEY, ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DIRECT COMPETITION
AMONG CABLE TELEVISION SYSTEMS (EAG Paper No. 86-9, June 5, 1989) (an application
of the traditional approach).
20. Hazlett, supra note 5, at 77.
21. Id. at 77-80.
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B. Public Choice Considerations and Rent Dissipation
Hazlett's second criticism of the traditional cost/benefit approach
is based on his public choice model.2 He notes that the potential
welfare gains from preventing overbuild competition arise from the
increased profits of the incumbent and argues that these "gains are
easily appropriated by the franchising authority . . ., and then
dissipated in the ensuing quest for private assignment."2 Thus,
under Hazlett's public choice scenario, the incumbent generally will
be granted a monopoly franchise and wasteful rent-seeking approxi-
mately equal to the monopolist's gains will result. Hazlett concludes
that the franchising process is "nakedly inefficient from a welfare
perspective."24
Even if monopolists do transfer monopoly rents to public officials,
it is unclear what portion of the monopolist's incremental profits is
dissipated in inefficient rent-seeking activities, such as unneccessary
consultants' studies, and what portion is transferred to franchising
authorities and special interest groups as side payments of cash and
kind. Presumably, a significant portion of the monopoly rents must
be transferred if the incumbent is to outbid consumers and would-be
entrants for the allegiance of the municipal authorities in the public
choice equilibrium postulated by Hazlett. These transfers may not be
desirable from a distributional perspective, but they should not be
counted as welfare losses since they are captured by the recipients.
Hazlett also concludes that an open entry policy can never reduce
consumer surplus, regardless of whether entry actually occurs." This
proposition is certainly not always true and may not even be true in
most cases. If entry is effectively foreclosed by an incumbent with a
first-mover advantage, the municipality may use its franchising
authority to capture some portion of the monopoly rents for its
constituent consumers by requiring additional system features and
franchise fees."6 Indeed, since municipal rate-making authority
generally is preempted under the Cable Act, requiring system
features and franchise fees is likely to be the municipality's only
22. See id. at 80-84.
23. Id. at 84.
24. Id. at 86.
25. Id.
26. The modem literature on strategic entry deterrence is replete with demonstrations
that, in an industry with significant fixed cost-, d firm with a first-mover advantage may be
able to foreclose subsequent entry by making an initial sunk-cost investment in plant. See,
e.g., Dixit, The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence, 90 ECoN. J. 95 (1980). This analytical
paradigm is applied to the cable industry in SMILEY, supra note 19, at 11-17.
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means of increasing consumer surplus at the monopolist's expense.
Hazlett correctly points out that transfers in kind tend to be less
efficient than pure cash transfers or price reductions because the
costs to the operator are likely to exceed the benefits to consumers.
Still, the possibility remains that in markets where overbuild
competition is not economically viable, municipalities can use their
franchising authority to extract some benefits for consumers. To
argue that this process is inefficient is as much a criticism of the rate
deregulation provisions of the Cable Act as it is a criticism of
municipal franchising practices.
C. Private Rationalization of Cable Service
Hazlett argues that any inefficiencies of an open entry policy, such
as rent dissipation in a race to build preemptively or excessive
duplication of cable plant, can be internalized and minimized by
rational entrants using measures such as limit pricing, sustainable
pricing, mergers of competitors, and gentlemen's agreements among
potential competitors on territorial restrictions." I will defer my
discussion of the likelihood and credibility of entry-deterring pricing
until the next section. The likelihood of welfare-enhancing agree-
ments among competitors and the possible nonexistence of sus-
tainable prices are discussed below.
1. Agreements Among Competitors
Relying on mergers and "gentlemens' territorial agreements"
among competitors to rationalize entry and production without
suppressing competition requires either a great deal of faith in the
altruism of cable operators or an extremely enlightened and effective
antitrust policy. One of the difficulties in evaluating Hazlett's
proposal for open entry is that the conditions under which potential
and actual competitors would be allowed to enter "gentlemen's
agreements" or merge are not clearly specified. I am unconvinced
that the rationalization of production by private action is as
straightforward as Hazlett suggests. Indeed, I suspect that many of
the conflicts and ambiguities of franchising policy would resurface as
antitrust problems under an open entry policy.
Hazlett suggests that an efficient open entry policy may require
the municipality to sponsor gentlemen's agreements among firms
27. Hazlett, supra note 5, at 84 n.81.
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on initial territorial restrictions in order to avoid excessive plant
duplication and rent dissipation in an inefficient race to build. 8 He
gives an example of the apparently successful implementation of such
agreements in Dade County, Florida.2'  According to Hazlett, the
county ultimately reneged on its pro-competitive policy, which is
consistent with Hazlett's rather pessimistic view of public choice.
The Dade County incident illustrates an interesting practical
problem with Hazlett's approach. It appears that some municipal
intervention was necessary in this case in order to get the competi-
tive process started and have it function effectively. However, if
Hazlett's analysis of public choice is correct, it is hard to see why
one would expect municipal management of territorial restrictions to
promote the interests of consumers. Thus, if one accepts Hazlett's
public choice model, one would expect open entry to suffer from
many of the same defects that Hazlett attributes to the franchising
process.
A similar problem exists with respect to the municipality's
procedure for allocating building permits to competing cable
operators. During the construction phase, municipal authorities are
necessarily involved in issuing building permits to protect public
health and safety. Since each permit is, in effect, a temporary
mini-franchise, the municipality can still exercise significant control
over the scope and pace of construction through the permitting
process. Moreover, since entry can often be foreclosed by a firm with
a first-mover advantage, and since a first mover is likely to enjoy
significant pecuniary gains, would-be entrants are likely to compete
for favorable treatment in obtaining permits. Conversly, building
inspectors may be tempted to win favors from operators by expe-
diting some permits and delaying others. In short, preemption of
municipal franchising authority may simply shift many of the
problems that Hazlett identifies from the franchising arena to the
28. Smiley has demonstrated that, in some markets, overbuild competition could be
foreclosed by a first-mover, but competition would be viable if entry were allowed to occur
in controlled stages. See SMILEY, supra note 19, at 24, 27 (Table 1 and accompanying text).
In these markets, the municipality could avoid the monopoly outcome by dividing its
franchise area into sections, awarding an initial franchise for each section to a different firm,
and later permitting each firm to expand into the territories of the other firms. In effect,
this practice rules out a preemptive complete build by the first entrant and preserves
welfare-enhancing fringe competition among the franchisees. It also has the advantage of
eliminating the welfare-reducing rent dissipation caused by an inefficient race to build,
that is likely to occur if simultaneous, unrestricted entry is permitted. Thus, there exist
cases where regulation of entry by municipal authorities can promote competition and
increase consumer surplus and total welfare.
29. See Hazlett, supra note 5, at 95.
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building inspector's office. Arguably, since potential conflicts of
interest are inherent in the construction process due to first-mover
advantages and the need for municipal health and safety regulation,
it is better to confront them in the franchising process, which is
relatively open to public scrutiny.
2. Sustainability of Natural Monopoly in Cable Television
Another potential problem with open entry is the possibility that
in some markets, a welfare-maximizing natural monopoly may be
unsustainable without regulatory prohibitions on entry10 Even if a
single cable system is the lowest cost provider of service to a
municipality made up of neighborhoods of differing population
densities, it may not be able to deter entry and sustain its natural
monopoly position by pricing alone. If a natural monopoly cable
system cannot price discriminate among neighborhoods and within
each neighborhood, entry by other systems that serve only the high
density neighborhoods may deprive the natural monopolist of
sufficient revenue to cover its fixed costs."1  If selective entry,
referred to as "cream skimming," persists, the natural monopolist will
eventually exit, or not enter in the first place if it correctly anti-
cipates the outcome, and the loss of consumer surplus in the
low-density neighborhoods may exceed any gains in the high density
neighborhoods. If open entry results in a net reduction in total
welfare and consumer surplus, a strong case can be made for
franchise protection.
Hazlett acknowledges the theoretical possibility of unsustainable
natural monopoly, but argues that it is of no practical importance
because profits of incumbent cable systems are high enough under
rate deregulation to enable them to withstand entry. As evidence, he
points to the fact that system market values are typically much
higher than construction costs."2 I suspect that Hazlett's conjecture
is true for the average system, but it may not be true for systems
that are closer to the margin of survival. In the latter case, entry
30. For a general exposition of the problem of unsustainable natural monopoly, see
Falhauber, Cross.Sutbsidization Princng in Public Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 966 (1975).
31. Hazlett notes that price discrimination is often constrained by statute. Hazlett,
supra note 5, at 97 n.119. In addition, he argues that price discrimination and universal
service requirements may be used by incumbents and municipalities to deter entry. Id. at
94, 97 n.119, 102, 109.
32. Id. at 96-99.
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restrictions may still be necessary to maximize consumer surplus and
welfare."3
All things considered, I stand by the conclusions of my previous
study that the welfare effects of overbuilds depend on local supply
and demand conditions and that generalizations about the appro-
priate role of overbuild competition are likely to be misleading.
3 4
Moreover, since neither Hazlett nor any other commentator has
produced convincing evidence that municipal authorities routinely act
in opposition to consumer interests in their franchising decisions,
there is a significant likelihood that across-the-board preemption of
municipal franchising authority would prevent some municipalities
from adopting welfare-enhancing entry policies. This does not mean
that municipal franchising is likely to improve welfare in all cases or
even in most cases. Instead, it suggests that Hazlett's universal open
entry policy has a potential downside that must be balanced against
the speculative gains from more widespread overbuild competition.
33. A simple example will illustrate the problem of unsustainability. Suppose that a
natural monopoly cable system can serve both a high and a low density neighborhood at
a total fixed cost of $2 million. Assume that service to the high density and low density
areas also can be provided separately at fixed costs of $0.75 million and $1.5 million
respectively. For simplicity, assume that marginal costs are zero in all cases. The cable
system is a natural monopoly because it can serve both areas for $0.25 million less than
they can be served on a stand-alone basis. In addition, suppose that the natural monopolist
charges the revenue-maximizing price in both areas, that revenue from each area is $1
million, and that consumer surplus in each area is $0.5 million. Note that the system's
total revenues of $2 million just cover its fixed costs and that total consumer surplus is
$1 million. If targeted entry is permitted in the high density area, residents may choose to
take their service from an entrant serving only that area. Moreover, the natural monopolist
would be vulnerable to entry by a stand-alone high density system because it could
underprice the incumbent in the high density market. Recall that the incumbent derives
revenues of $1 million from that market and that the entrant's costs will be only $0.75
million. If the incumbent matches the entrant's reduced price in the high density market,
its total revenues will fall below $2 million and it will not cover its total fixed costs. Unles
the incumbent can price discriminate in the low density market and extract enougi
additional consumer surplus there to cover its fixed costs while matching the entrant':
price in the high density market, it will fail to earn a competitive return on its capital anc
eventually exit both markets when its plant wears out. Since the high density specials
needs to underprice the incumbent only slightly to drive the incumbent out, the consumei
surplus gain in the high volume market will be very small. In contrast, stand-alone servic
in the low density market is not viable without price discrimination because maximun
revenues are less than stand-alone fixed costs. Thus, the low density market will not b4
served, and its entire consumer surplus of $0.5 million is lost. Total consumer am
producer surplus is now roughly $0.75 million, which is $0.25 million less than befon
entry.
34. SMILEY, supra note 19, 34-35.
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III. Likelihood of Direct Competition
Hazlett argues that, under a universal open entry policy, potential
and actual competition would be much more widespread and would
be a significant factor in constraining rates. I am much less optimis-
tic that competition would effectively constrain rates on a widespread
basis if municipal franchising authority were preempted.
A. Factors Affecting the Feasibility of Overbuild Competition
Under open entry, the economic feasibility of overbuild compe-
tition depends on local supply and demand conditions. Since most
domestic markets are already cabled, the would-be entrant must
decide whether it will earn positive profits in the post-entry
equilibrium. This in turn depends on the intensity of demand, the
ability of the entrant to differentiate its product from the incumbent,
the cost of cabling the community, and the strategic interaction
between the two firms. The potential entrant can anticipate that the
incumbent's price will be reduced in the post-entry equilibrium to
meet the competitive challenge.
In spite of Hazlett's optimism concerning open entry, the general
feasibility of overbuild competition is an empirical question. Using a
wide range of simulated supply and demand conditions, Smiley
found that an incumbent with a first-mover advantage can often
foreclose entry by cabling the entire franchise area." If it is difficult
for the entrant to differentiate its service from that of the incumbent,
entry is less likely to occur because prices are expected to be lower
in the post-entry equilibrium when the two services are closer
substitutes.
6
In my previous study of overbuilding, I suggested that the
entrant might differentiate its product from the incumbent by
obtaining exclusive rights to programming." However, achieving
significant programming differentiation has proven to be difficult in
practice. First, high quality programming is costly to produce and is
in limited supply. Producers of this programming are anxious to
reach as many consumers as possible. Hence, they are reluctant to
award exclusive distribution contracts to new entrants that are likely
35. Id. at 31-33.
36. For a thorough analysis of the effects of product differentiation on the likelihood
of entry, wee Dbdt, A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Enry Barties, 10 BELL J. ECON.
20, 20-22 (1979).
37. SMiLEY, supra note 19, at 32 n.40.
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to have smaller market shares. Second, it is unclear that consumers
would welcome two differentiated systems, since they probably would
prefer to have the entire menu of programming options available on
one system so that they would not have to subscribe to both systems
or switch back and forth. In short, the scenario of dueling, differen-
tiated cable systems suffers from a fundamental credibility problem:
programmers and consumers may not support it.
In overbuilt markets where the incumbent has adequate channel
capacity, I suspect that the incumbent and the entrant often would
wind up offering very similar slates of programming, i.e., the
standard lineup of cable fare. However, when programming is
relatively undifferentiated, it is less likely that post-entry equilibrium
prices would be high enough to attract entry in the first place.38
B. Empirical Evidence on Overbuilding
Hazlett notes that the rate of entry is increasing in the 1980s,
even though the number of overbuilds is still small in absolute
terms. He suggests that potential and actual competition would be
more prevalent were it not for franchise restrictions and predatory
behavior by incumbents."9 I would stress again that the prevalence
of overbuilding under an open entry policy is an empirical question
on which the jury is still out. The large percentage increase in the
small number of overbuilds is not at all surprising, given the
widespread deregulation of rates triggered by the Cable Act. One
would expect that, in markets with relatively high demand and low
construction cost where overbuilds are most likely to be economically
viable, sudden rate deregulation would dramatically increase the
probability of entry. However, it does not follow that overbuilds are
economically viable in most markets, given rate deregulation.
Hazlett's conjectures about the feasibility of overbuilding are
largely based on anecdotal evidence drawn from franchising disputes
during the 1980s. This evidence may suggest that municipalities have
occasionally tried to block entry or suppress competition, but it does
not allow one to draw general conclusions about the feasibility of
overbuilding under an open entry policy.
38. An exception to this dilemma occurs when the incumbent lacks adequate channel
capacity to carry as much programming as the entrant. For an example of this in the
Telesat case, see Hazlett, supra note 5. at 92-96.
39. Hazlett, supra note 5, at 112-1S.
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C. Potential Enfry, Contestability, Limit Pricing, and Schumpeterian
Competition
Hazlett argues that, under an open entry policy, actual overbuild
competition may not be necessary to constrain rates and improve
service because the threat of potential competition will do the job.
He suggests several mechanisms that might induce incumbents to
restrain prices and improve efficiency including "the contestability
principle," the establishment of a credible, long-term commitment to
an entry-deterring price, and Schumpeterian competition of
successive monopoly firms.' Hazlett's optimism on this point does
not appear to be well supported by either theory or empirical
evidence.
1. Contestability of Cable Television Markets
The theory of contestability postulates that the incumbent's price
will be effectively constrained in industries where hit-and-run entry
is feasible. Hit-and-run entry requires that the entrant can enter and
exit quickly and costlessly in response to a price increase or decrease
by the incumbent." In practical terms, this means that the entrant
must incur no sunk costs and be able to enter and exit almost as
quickly as the incumbent can change its price. Given the large sunk
costs and time lags required to cable a city and the ability of the
incumbent to adjust prices quickly under rate deregulation, it would
be hard to find a more unlikely candidate for contestability than the
cable industry.
2. Limit Pricing
Hazlett's conjecture that the incumbent will employ a long-run
limit price to deter entry is dubious on theoretical grounds. The
problem is that there is little reason to believe that the incumbent
can make a credible, long-term commitment to an entry-deterring
price because prices can easily be changed after entry occurs.
Recognizing this, the potential entrant is likely to base its entry
decision not on the incumbent's pre-entry price, but on the price
expected to prevail in the post-entry duopoly equilibrium, assuming
40. Id. at 100-01.
41. See Schwartz, The Nature and Scope of Contestability Theory, 38 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS
37, 38 (1986).
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profit maximizing behavior by each duopolist. Similarly, the
incumbent recognizes that the potential entrant's decision is likely
to depend only on the expected post-entry equilibrium price, which
is determined by supply and demand conditions and the strategic
interaction, and not on the incumbent's pre-entry price. Thus, the
rational incumbent is likely to charge what the market will bear
before entry occurs and to respond with selective price cuts only
after entry actually occurs.Y
The pricing scenario outlined above seems roughly consistent with
the anecdotal evidence on overbuilds provided by Hazlett. In most
cases, the standard response of the incumbent to an aggressive
overbuilder seems to have been to employ price cuts targeted at
areas where entry actually had occurred while keeping prices in
other areas at higher levels."'
3. Schumpeterian Competition
I tend to agree with Hazlett that there is some hope for
Schumpeterian competition whereby old monopolists are replaced
by new ones in a process of creative destruction. However, because
of my pessimism about the practicality of widespread overbuild
competition, I believe that Schumpeterian competition is more likely
to come from other technologies, such as high-definition direct
broadcast satellite or fiber optic systems, than from conventional
coaxial cable systems. Moreover, while the prospect of a technologi-
cal revolution may be comforting in the long run, it will do nothing
to provide relief from any extant supracompetitive pricing while
cable remains the preeminent multichannel video distribution
medium.
IV. Public Policy Options
The major thrust of Hazlett's argument is that, under rate
deregulation, society would be better served by a universal policy of
open entry. Since Hazlett's public choice model implies the reluc-
42. A complete discussion of the extensive literature on limit pricing is beyond the
scope of this comment. A brief introduction and critique of the literature can be found in
Schwartz, supra note 41, at 37-40. The strategic interaction of entry and pricing decisions
described in the text is discussed and modeled in SMILEY, supra note 19, at 9-17.
43. Hazlett implies that targeted price cutting by the incumbent may be predatory.
Hazlett, supra note 5, at 104-07. Note, however, that predatory pricing and competitive
behavior are observationally equivalent: in both cases, the incumbent's price falls after entry
occurs.
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tance of municipalities to promote competition voluntarily, the
implementation of an open entry policy at the federal level would
require revision of the Cable Act to preempt municipal franchising
authority. Hazlett's analysis of franchising policy is predicated on
the assumption that federal law will continue to preempt municipal
rate regulation." However, once the issue of revising the Cable Act
is opened, I would argue that it is more appropriate to consider
cable policy in a broader context that allows for the possibility of
some form of rate regulation. Indeed, judging by the latest news
from Washington, D.C., Congress is currently giving more serious
consideration to reinstituting rate regulation than to preemption of
municipal franchising authority.4
A. Alternative Regulatory Regimes
If we consider cable policy in a broader framework, the four
possible regulatory regimes are municipal regulation of rates and
franchising (the previous regime), municipal franchising and the
federal preemption of rate regulation (the current regime under the
Cable Act), municipal rate regulation and federal preemption of
franchising, and federal preemption of rate regulation and franchis-
ing (advocated by Hazlett). All but the third option are currently
under serious discussion. Municipalities, consumer lobbying groups,
and numerous congressmen have shown considerable interest in
reregulating rates. Hazlett and prospective overbuilders such as
Telesat advocate a laissez faire approach to rates and entry. Incum-
bent cable system operators appear to prefer the status quo.
As far as I am aware, the possibility of municipal rate regulation
and federal preemption of franchising authority has never been
seriously considered. Perhaps it should be. In theory, when current
franchises expire, municipalities could conduct a Dutch auction for
cable service by offering a sequence of increasing long-term rate caps
44. Hazlett notes that:
Because federal law now prohibits local price control, the standard cost/benefit
analysis has been simplified. The traditional economic approach evaluates monopoly
franchise regulation by weighing the social benefits derived from controlling prices
against the various costs associated with such a regulatory regime. This approach
is dearly inappropriate when the regulators no longer control output prices.
Id. at 85.
45. Currently, there are several rate reregulation bills pending before Congress. See
Pytte, Cable TV The New Big Kid Confronts Re-Regulation, CONG. Q., Dec. 9, 1989, at
3361-3366.
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until at least one cable operator, presumably the most efficient,
stepped forward to apply for a building permit. This approach
might answer some of Hazlett's objections to current franchising
procedures because it would not allow municipal authorities to select
the winner. At the same time, it might provide a more effective
constraint on rates than complete laissez faire." It suffices to say that
it behooves economists who would influence the current debate over
cable policy to include a broad range of alternative ratemaking and
franchising regimes on the menu of policy options.
B. Federal Preemption Versus Local Control
Finally, Hazlett draws a parallel between First Amendment
protection of freedom of speech and universal open entry, arguing
that each of these policies "can best be understood as a calculated
trade-off sacrificing regulatory flexibility for a higher mean market
outcome, given all relevant constraints."'47 In particular, he argues
that a discretionary municipal franchising policy may prove inferior
to a uniform policy of open entry ". . . that, on average, gets it
right."" I am troubled by the suggestion that federal preemption of
local control is the appropriate response to the problems of the
industry because it runs against the presumption that decisions
involving economic regulation, including whether or not to regulate,
should be vested in the political jurisdictions whose constituencies
directly reap the benefits and bear the costs of those decisions. Since
the primary economic consequences of cable regulation fall on local
communities, this presumption suggests that regulatory authority
over cable should rest with municipal governments."
46. As with most regulatory regimes, this one suffers from its share of practical
drawbacks. First, if only one entrant steps forward and subsequently fails to perform, the
municipality would have to restart the process. Second, the price cap mechanism would
eliminate some of the upward flexibility of rates and might suppress improvements in
product quality. Third, municipal governments might have difficulty making a credible
commitment to keep the price cap at the specified level in the long run. For a general
discussion of the potential costs and benefits of price cap regulation, see Brennan, Regulation
by 'Capping' Prices, 1 J. RzG. ECON. 133 (1989).
47. Hazlett, supra note 5, at 117.
48. Id. at 116.
49. See Brennan, Local Government Action and Antitrust Policy: An Economic Analysis, 12
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 405 (1984); Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 23 (1983). Brennan notes that "the theoretical presumption consistent with
economic reasoning is that federal intervention in a matter affecting only the citizens within
a smaller governmental unit is unwarranted." Brennan, supra, at 409. He then identifies
three possible justifications for intervention that may overcome the presumption: economies
of expertise, maintaining procedural integrity, and external effects on parties outside the
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Federal preemption of municipal regulation does not necessarily
eliminate government influence from cable markets. Instead, it
merely substitutes federal influence for municipal influence, which
should come as cold comfort to advocates of laissez faire. Recall that
the current regime of deregulated rates and monopoly franchises,
which Hazlett finds so unsatisfactory, was crafted by the United
States Congress and the FCC, not by municipal governments.
Indeed, the municipal public choice problem identified by Hazlett is
likely to be exacerbated by federal preemption of cable policy.
Hazlett correctly points out that cable operators acted opportunisti-
cally against municipalities and consumers in securing federal passage
of the Cable Act,' which had the effect of abrogating thousands of
contractual rate commitments that had been freely entered into by
cable operators in the pre-deregulation era.5" This episode suggests
that the difficulty of organizing consumers to protect their interests
in the arena of federal policymaking for cable may be even greater
than at the municipal level.
Hazlett cites Kahn's devastating critique of the ICC's regulation
of the trucking industry to support the notion that regulation often
results in needless restrictions on entry.52 It is unfortunate that we
have no assurance that Congress and the FCC will do a better job
of rewriting the competitive rules for the cable industry than the
ICC did for trucking. In short, we must ask ourselves whether local
cable regulation, while highly imperfect, is likely to be
welfare-enhancing relative to federal preemption.
In summary, while I agree with Hazlett that the regulatory
regime created by the Cable Act is highly unsatisfactory, I am
skeptical of his public choice model and unconvinced that an open
entry policy alone would effectively constrain rates in most domestic
cable markets. Moreover, I remain convinced that the potential
inefficiencies of overbuilds create a significant downside for an open
locality. Id. at 409-19. Since local cable franchising decisions are unlikely to have a major
economic impact on parties outside the municipality and since federal authorities are not
notably better than local authorities at conducting cost/benefit analysis of options for cable
service in local markets, the major justification for federal preemption of franchising
authority would have to be Hazlett's public choice argument that municipal franchising lacks
procedural integrity because municipal authorities fail to represent consumer interests. Note
that this paradigm does not address the case where municipal regulation violates some
inalienable constitutional right such as freedom of speech.
50. Hazlett, supra note 5, at 89.
51. Although the Cable Act is commonly described as deregulatory, it could be viewed
as the imposition of federal regulation on a previously unregulated market for cable service
procurement between municipalities and cable operators.
52. Hazlett, supra note 5, at 115 n.178.
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entry policy in some markets. In my view, the net welfare effects of
a universal open entry policy with no other changes in federal
regulation remains an open question. However, even if I were sure
that universal open entry would be welfare-enhancing, I would
question the wisdom of complete federal preemption of cable
regulation. Instead, I believe it is more productive to consider cable
policy in the context of a broader menu of regulatory options.

